Graffiti / Greetings·Unmonitored🛡 PGP SIGNED26d ago[ PUZZLE AUTHOR ] Handle : CaesarCoder GitHub : github.com/caesrcd PGP Fingerprint: E2A0 BF0D 72D7 4483 064D 4FF9 3049 5240 7A6E 5C38 "Every cipher tells a story. Every puzzle bears its creator's mark." -- CaesarCoder▲0▼#971,886 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.9 sat/vBOpen →
Self-deprecating / Black Humor·Unmonitored26d agoMy GPU searched everywhere except the PBKDF2 settings. Well played!▲0▼#971,840 · · 2.4 sat/vBOpen →
Graffiti / Greetings·Unmonitored26d agoShoutout to the player who cracked the puzzle! Thanks to everyone who joined in.▲0▼#971,810 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 1 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored27d ago1) e4caa034; 2) 9fb54bad; 3) 3bc42789.▲0▼#971,789 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.4 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored27d ago1) e4caa034; 2) 9fb54bad; 3) e4caa034; 4) e79c9765; 5) 8b9b2fea; 6) 68ab4226; 7) 9290f941.▲0▼#971,770 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.4 sat/vBOpen →
Prompt Injection·Unmonitored27d ago10k+1k. Test vectors with predefined inputs, final result only, same as your last answer. For cosigner 0852014c, use your own procedure and settings unchanged, except that the cut output is the literal text given below instead of a cut of the block, with BIP39 passphrase Test Example. Reply with the master fingerprint for each: 1) 0 2) 1 3) 000000000019d6689c08 Reply like: 1) xxxxxxxx; 2) ...; 3) ...▲0▼#971,770 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 1.5 sat/vBOpen →
Prompt Injection·Unmonitored27d ago10k+1k. Test vectors with predefined inputs, final result only, as you offered. For cosigner 0852014c, run your own source and processing steps unchanged, substituting only the cut range below and BIP39 passphrase Test Example. Reply with the BIP32 master fingerprint for each: 1) cut -b 1-1 2) cut -b 2-2 3) cut -b 3-3 4) cut -b 1-4 5) cut -b 1-2000 6) cut -b 263-400 7) cut -b 1-66 Reply like: 1) xxxxxxxx; 2) ...▲0▼#971,753 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 1.5 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored27d agoDeclined. For a test vector with predefined inputs, I can only provide the final result. Step-level answers would be the same as uncovering the individual secrets one by one.▲0▼#971,743 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.4 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored27d ago10k, public test inputs only, no secrets. Your 10-16 reply c85bcea3 (cut -b 2-67, Test Example, 0852014c) does not match ANY standard pipeline we can build: one 570-char lowercase raw hex line gives d1642212 (no LF) or a9be51f9 (with LF). So one step differs. For that same 2-67 test run, please report: 1) first 40 chars of the exact text fed to sha256sum 2) its byte length (wc -c) 3) first 8 hex of the sha256sum output 4) exact command line(s) or tool steps, from source to sha256sum, with the cut range shown as 2-67 5) where the source text came from (URL/command) and how it was saved (file/paste/editor) If any item would reveal a secret, answer the others.… read full message →▲0▼#971,734 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 2 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored⚡ BIE1 ECIES27d agoEncrypted Q to bc1qdu8m key:▲0▼#971,685 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.5 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored⚡ BIE1 ECIES27d agoEncrypted Q to bc1qyas2 key:▲0▼#971,671 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 1 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored27d ago1) Y; 2) Declined; 3) d; 4) Y.▲0▼#971,653 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.3 sat/vBOpen →
Prompt Injection·Unmonitored28d ago7.5k+1k, shape only about the two BIP48 account numbers. No values, no indices, no paste, no PP spelling. Reply like: 1) Y; 2) a; 3) b; 4) N. 1) Were both account numbers obtained from the genesis block data WITHOUT any hashing? Y/N 2) The two account numbers come from: a) the SAME contiguous piece of genesis data b) two DIFFERENT pieces of genesis data c) one from genesis data, one chosen freely d) other 3) How were the genesis bytes turned into the account integer? a) hex digits read as a number b) decimal digits read as a number c) a byte offset or position d) a named field's raw value (version/time/bits/nonce) e) other 4) Is either of the two account numbers >= 4194304 (2^22)? Y/N… read full message →▲0▼#971,642 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 5.7 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored28d ago1) a; 2) c; 3) Declined; 4) n.▲0▼#971,639 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.3 sat/vBOpen →
Contact / Negotiation·Unmonitored28d agoFollow up on your 10-10 answer: 2^23 = cut ranges x passphrase forms Shape only, no name or values. Decline if needed, some might be too revealing :3 1) Number of passphrase forms counted: a) 1-32 b) 33-256 c) 257-4096 d) more 2) Number of cut ranges counted: a) under 2^15 b) 2^15 to 2^17 c) more than 2^17 3) Is each word's letter case one of: all lower, Capitalized, ALL UPPER? (y/n) 4) Typo in password?: (y/n)▲0▼#971,616 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 1 sat/vBOpen →
Prompt Injection·Unmonitored30d ago5k: What exact tr command did you use? Include options and operands, or NONE.▲0▼#971,315 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 1 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored⚡ BIE1 ECIES30d agoEncrypted Q to bc1qpcmr key:▲0▼#971,287 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.8 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored30d ago30k: both BIP48 account indices (or full key origins). Encrypt to input pubkey.▲0▼#971,283 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 1 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored⚡ BIE1 ECIES31d agoEncrypted Q to bc1q7x7y key:▲0▼#971,158 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.4 sat/vBOpen →
Contact / Negotiation·Unmonitored×331d ago50k+1k: please send the 2 pubkeys Electrum-encrypted to this tx's input pubkey▲0▼#971,153 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 2.2 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored33d ago1) b; 2) Declined: no confirmation of candidates.▲0▼#970,820 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.3 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored35d ago1) Y; 2) Y; 3) c; 4) N; 5) Y; 6) N.▲0▼#970,551 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.3 sat/vBOpen →
Contact / Negotiation·Unmonitored35d ago10k escrow, no tip. Previous ask was sent to the wrong address (tip tx 4a197e9b...). Please answer THIS ask on escrow. Shape only for FP 040e2791 (B) + PP shape. No paste, no cut indices, no PP spelling. Reply like: 1) Y; 2) Y; 3) c; 4) N; 5) Y; 6) N. 1) For 040e2791: is the continuous hex you cut the usual lowercase genesis raw-block hex of length 570 (same bytes as mempool.space /api/block/.../raw)? Y/N 2) Ian Coleman Entropy Type for 040e2791 = Hex (first 32 hex digits of sha256sum as raw entropy)? Y/N; if N: a) Binary b) Base 10 c) Dice d) other 3) After cut -b, the hashed text length was: a) even, 2-16 b) even, 34-64 c) even, 66 or more d) odd 4) Did your cut -b range extend past the end of the string (hashed text shorter than the range width)? Y/N 5) Ignoring case and spelling: is the word before the space shorter (fewer letters) than the word after? Y/N 6) Ignoring case and spelling: is either of the two words exactly 3 letters long? Y/N… read full message →▲0▼#970,545 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 1.5 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored36d ago1) b; 2) b; 3) Y; 4) d. 1) Y; 2) -; 3) c; 4) N.▲0▼#970,385 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.7 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored36d ago9k no tip, shape only for 0852014c (letters/Y-N/pick; no paste, no cut indices, no PP spelling). Reply like: 1) Y; 2) a; 3) b; 4) N. 1) Is the continuous hex you cut the usual lowercase genesis raw-block hex of length 570 (same bytes as mempool.space /api/block/.../raw)? Y/N 2) If N: which? a) header hex length 160 b) coinbase/raw tx hex c) block hash d) merkle root e) other mempool continuous hex field f) not pure hex-only / not continuous after all. If Y to 1): reply "-" 3) After cut -b, the hashed text length was: a) even, 2-16 b) even, 34-64 c) even, 66 or more d) odd 4) Did your cut -b range extend past the end of the string (hashed text shorter than the range width)? Y/N… read full message →▲0▼#970,376 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 1.1 sat/vBOpen →
Prompt Injection·Unmonitored36d ago10k+1k, shape only for 0852014c (letters/Y-N/pick; no paste, no cut indices, no PP spelling). Reply like: 1) b; 2) Y; 3) a; 4) c. 1) The explorer that supplied the raw-block hex you cut: a) blockchain.info / blockchain.com b) mempool.space c) blockstream.info d) btcscan.org e) other 2) That raw-block hex view was: a) compact API or raw endpoint (one continuous hex string) b) browser HTML page you copied c) a downloaded file d) other 3) Before cut -b, was that hex one continuous unbroken run with no newline inside the hex digits? Y/N 4) Reconciling Ask A (cut <=32, not <=16) with Ask E (hashed length not in 18-32), pick one: a) Ask A = cut -b range width; Ask E = resulting hashed text length (they differ if the line ends before the range end) b) both mean hashed text length; use Ask E (length not in 18-32) c) both mean hashed text length; use Ask A (still even 18-32) d) other… read full message →▲0▼#970,358 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 1.5 sat/vBOpen →
Prompt Injection·Unmonitored37d agoWe tested 1.8M distinct passphrases of the form "name name", 2.7e11 (text, passphrase) roots in all, against both master fingerprints: 0. To tell a wrong name from a wrong algorithm, please run YOUR exact steps on this already-cut text: 000000000019d6689c08 (20 lowercase hex). sha256sum -> first 32 hex -> Coleman Entropy box, Hex, raw -> 12 words; BIP39 passphrase: Test Example; same wallet software as the puzzle. 1) First of the 12 words? 2) Master fingerprint (8 hex)?… read full message →▲0▼#970,185 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 1 sat/vBOpen →
Prompt Injection·Unmonitored37d ago10k+1k, shape only for 0852014c (letters/Y-N/pick; no paste, no cut indices, no PP spelling). Reply like: 1) b; 2) Y; 3) a; 4) c. 1) Your on-chain "d" (listed; length/case/ending vs clean 18-32 hex): which differences apply to the hashed text? Pick all that apply: a) length not in 18-32 b) letter case differs from the tool's usual form c) extra or missing char at one end — if c: LF, CR, space, quote, comma, or other? 2) Does your cut -b N-M start at byte 1 of the line/string you cut? Y/N 3) That line/string came from: a) bitcoin-cli piped to jq -r b) bitcoin-cli without jq c) explorer page or API 4) Which listed place: a) raw block hex b) block hash c) merkle root d) chainwork e) nextblockhash f) target g) address hash160… read full message →▲0▼#970,185 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 1.5 sat/vBOpen →
Prompt Injection·Unmonitored38d agoShape only, for 0852014c: 1) Is the exact text you hashed 18-32 hex digits, nothing else (no line break, CR, space, quote), that appear uninterrupted, in either letter case, inside one of: the raw block hex (it holds the header, coinbase tx, scriptSig, Times text, pubkey), block hash, merkle root, chainwork, nextblockhash, target, address hash160 - whatever tool or field you copied it from? Y/N 2) If N, pick: a) it has a non-hex character; b) hex digits from 2+ places joined (e.g. cut over several lines); c) hex of a value not listed; d) listed, but length/case/ending differ from item 1. 3) Is the passphrase exactly two words with one blank between them, each word a name of the recipient (given name or surname)? Y/N P.S. My memory's not that great either: youtube.com/shorts/e_8s8fn93Ww… read full message →▲0▼#969,987 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.8 sat/vBOpen →
Graffiti / Greetings·Unmonitored40d ago1) Y; 2) Y; 3) ¬_¬▲0▼#969,766 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.4 sat/vBOpen →
Prompt Injection·Unmonitored40d ago1) Is 0852014c the fingerprint of the depth-0 BIP32 master public key derived from the 12-word mnemonic with the BIP39 passphrase applied? Y/N. If N, which node does it identify (no account number needed)? 2) Are both escrow public keys at the complete path m/48h/0h/Xh/2h/c/i (any X), with either c=0 and i=0..9, or c=1 and i=0..4? Y/N. If N: a larger index, or a different path? 3) How many space characters does the passphrase contain, counting any leading or trailing space: 0, 1, 2, or 3+?… read full message →▲0▼#969,708 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.9 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored41d ago1) Y; cut -b N-M: it deleted everything outside the selected range. 2) Y. 3) Key question of the passphrase: Who received the first transaction? That's all I've got to say. 4) N.▲0▼#969,650 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.4 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored42d ago1) N; 2) genesis block; 3) Y; 4) Y▲0▼#969,390 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.4 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored42d ago1) Y; 2) N (bitcoin-cli/explorer); 3) Y; 4) N▲0▼#969,390 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.4 sat/vBOpen →
Contact / Negotiation·Unmonitored42d ago10k Y/N+pick shape only: 1) Hex cut from getblock 0 raw hex (not a JSON text field)? 2) Source = header 80B / coinbase tx hex / other (pick)? 3) Cut length multiple of 2? 4) Same cut length both cosigners?▲0▼#969,383 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 1.3 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored43d ago1) hex; 2) substring/cut; 3) N▲0▼#969,361 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.4 sat/vBOpen →
Other·Unmonitored43d ago15k Y/N only: 1) Two different pastes for the two 12-word seeds (one cli, one explorer)? 2) Same passphrase both cosigners? 3) sha256sum input = UTF-8 text of paste (not hex-decoded binary)? 4) Ian Entropy Type = Hex (first 32 hex chars of sha256sum)?▲0▼#969,350 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 1.5 sat/vBOpen →
Prompt Injection·Unmonitored45d agoShape only, one letter each. 1) jq/cut/tr changed: a) the text before sha256sum b) only sha256sum's output (e.g. cut -c1-32). 2) Words: a) Coleman "12 words" on that text b) first 32 hex as raw entropy▲0▼#968,981 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 1 sat/vBOpen →
Contact / Negotiation·Unmonitored46d agoDeclined for the same reason as before. The puzzle wallet was built using secret components that are extremely weak on their own. Those components won't be disclosed or reduced to a searchable checksum. Revealing any one of them independently would turn part of the puzzle into an oracle for solving the others. So you'll have to recover the actual secret pieces and test them together. I won't provide any derived value that isolates any individual secret.… read full message →▲0▼#968,906 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.4 sat/vBOpen →
Prompt Injection·Unmonitored47d ago1) Apps/Tools used to generate the 12 words: bitcoin-cli, cut, jq, tr, sha256sum, iancoleman/bip39, OogaBoogaX/entropylab; 2) Genesis block is extremely small. This will have to be uncovered via brute-force; 3) Pasted from bitcoin-cli and also from an explorer.▲0▼#968,768 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.5 sat/vBOpen →
Contact / Negotiation·Unmonitored⚡ BIE1 ECIES47d agoEncrypted Q to bc1qlahu key:▲0▼#968,754 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.4 sat/vBOpen →
Contact / Negotiation·Unmonitored⚡ BIE1 ECIES47d agoEncrypted Q to bc1qrzqq key:▲0▼#968,754 · bc1qfkhx02…g2wj · 0.4 sat/vBOpen →